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Introduction
The invention, diffusion, and adoption of new technology has long
been a crucial, yet imperfectly understood, feature of agricultural de-
velopment. Throughout man’s history, agricultural productivity increases
have come about (1) by the diffusion of traditional crops, animals, tools,
and methods into new areas of settlement and (2) by the introduction of
new crops, animals, tools, and methods into traditional agricultural
L38T During the last century, these processes have been systems. _
accelerated by systematic efforts to identify, collect and diffuse
superior crop varieties, livestock breeds and production practices
throughout the major agricultural regions of the world. These systematic
efforts have been supplemented by programs of adaptive research and ex-





leading regions and farms to less-advanced regions
advance is particularly important to producers and
products moving in international commerce. Foreign2
exchange earnings from exports of primary agricultural products underPin
the development programs of many poorer nations. Farm income and employ-
ment in many developing nations are major components of overall national
economic activity and depend heavily on foreign sales. On the other
hand, consumers in both producing and importing nations have an important
stake in international technological advance. When gains from innovation
are passed along, consumers may benefit by lower prices and wider avail-
able selections of food and fiber products.
The purpose of this paper is to examine three cases which provide
some insight into the character of international transmission of techni-
cal change and its economic impacts and implications. These cases focus
on three separate commodities, sugarcane, bananas, and rice. Each c~se
presents different facets of the international movement of technological
innovation.
The section on sugarcane emphasizes the role of experiment station
research in the development of new, higher yielding varieties and the
subsequent diffusion of these varieties throughout the sugar-growing
world. An attempt is made to assess the economic impact of the de-




The section on the banana trade illustrates how the
adoption of disease-resistant banana varieties in
led to further innovations in marketing and processing
techniques. The joint impact of these innovations is discussed in
terms of changes in output, prices, and patterns of comparative advan-
tage among producing nations. The section on rice trade illustrateshow technical change in rice production in Japan was transferred to other
producing nations, mainly Korea and Taiwan. The resulting increase in
rice exports from these countries to Japan had substantial impacts on
Japanese rice production and prices in the pre-World War 11 period. An
attempt is made to measure these effects and to assess their economic
implications.
Commonthreads run through each of these cases. A basic component
of the technical changes examined in each of the three commodities is
the development and diffusion of improved plant materials flowing from
both public and private research efforts. In addition, each of these
cases illustrates that, in one way or another, the pace of technical
advance is linked to changes in economic incentives as viewed by in-
dividual producers and policy-making institutions. For each of these
commodities, the complex web of international economic relationships
has diffused the impact of a given technological advance far beyond




This section explores the technical changes in sugarcane produc-
tion that have resulted from the development and introduction of new
sugarcane varieties, Four stages of progress in varietal development
are identified and the relative contributions to varietal progress by
the major sugarcane experiment stations of the world are evaluated.
Inter-country and intra-country transmission of varieties is assessed4
and related to the stages of progress in varietal development. The im-
plications for world sugar trade of the particular pattern of genera-
tion and transmission of technical change exhibited in this industry
are explored.
Production and yield data are presented for eighteen major sugar-
cane producing countries in Table 1.1. The relative position of a
number of countries has changed considerably over time. The increased
importance of Brazil and Mexico and the decline in production in
Indonesia (Java) are especially striking. The yield data are incom-
plete, but the substantial increases taking place in India, South
Africa, continental United States (Louisiana and Florida), Hawaii,







the history of attempts to improve yields through the
new varieties reveals four important stages.
Selection ~Natural (Wild~ Varieties
1887 the varieties planted were basically wild canes
selected over many years by planters in sugarcane-
producing areas. These wild canes had originated in India, NewGuinea
and Java. In most cases, planters had relied on a single variety for
many years. Planters experimented with new varieties but generally
speaking the only varieties that survived over time were those re-
sistant to the diseases prevailing in the area of
niques of cultivation, irrigation, and processing
production. Tech-
were well developed5
in most producing countries by 1887, and sugar was qn’ important world
2/ trade oommodity by that time.-
$taae ~ -- Crossinq~V@@~ ‘
in 1887 in the newly-founded experiment station in Barbados,
British West Indies and in 1889 in the experiment station in Java,
sugarcane seedlings were first produced through ‘a process of sexual
reproduction. fi,40,3~T This wasofgreat importance since it
opened the possibility that varieties could be crossed. The cane plant
ordinarily does not flower and produce seedlings readily, The induce-
ment of flowering in the cane plant depends on temperature and light
control and few experiment stations were successful in their attempts
to produce seedlings in the early days of cane cross-breeding. ~/
Several experiment stations had notable successes in the develop-
ment of the first new varieties, The Java station (Proefstatien Oost
Java, P.O.J.) was the first to develop
commercial importance. It later added
Hawaii and Barbados had also developed
a new variety (P.O.J, 100) of
,many more important varieties.
important commercial cane vari-
eties by 1900. The Coimbatore experiment station in India released the
first of itsCo. varieties in 1912. This station and the Java station
were destined to develop varieties that would be planted commercially
in every major cane-producing area of the world by 1930.
W~--E& eedinq for Disease Resistance .— .
Sugarcane disease did not diminish in importance with the intro-
duction of the first new varieties, In many countries, the new vari-
eties which yielded substantially more than the traditional native6
5/
varieties were invaded by diseases within a few years.- The Java sta-
tion took the lead in developing disease-resistant varieties. In 1921
the variety P.O.J. 2878 was produced. Its pedigree included the first
important Java variety, P.O.J. 100, as a
to be resistant to most important cane d:
variety as well. More than 50,000 acres
grandparent. P.O.J. 2878 proved
seases and to be a high yielding
were planted to this variety by
1926-- a remarkable expansion in plant material from a single seedling
in 1921. BY 1929 more than 400,000 acres were planted in Java, and it
was being planted in many other countries. This “wonder cane” became
the most widely planted single variety in the world.
In the 1920-40 period the Coimbatore station in India also produced
a number of important varieties which incorporated disease resistance
and high-yielding ability. These varieties were planted widely through-
out the world. Varieties developed in the British West Indies (Barbados)
and Hawaii were also planted extensively outside the regions in which
they were developed.
-Z--B ~eedinq~ Specific Soil @Climatq Conditions
The latest phase in the development of new varietal technology in-
volves the breeding of varieties suited to the specific soil, climate,
disease conditions and cultivating techniques of small regions. For the
most part this breeding must be undertaken by the experiment station or
stations in a specific region. The scopefcr international transmission
of technical change through varietal transfer is limited. However, in-
formation about breeding techniques and the potential of certain vari-
eties as parent stock have been exchanged, as have genetic materials.
j7
More than 100 sugarcane experiment stations now exist in the world. Al-
most every important cane-producing country is now using locally-developed
Stage IV varieties. This is illustrated by the data in Table 1.2. The de-
velopment of Stage IV varieties in Queensland, South Africa, Puerto Rico,
and Louisiana is reflected in the percentage of acreage planted to
locally-developed varieties in these countries.
Table 1.3 shows the relative importance of the major varieties of
sugarcane in the world during the 1940-64 period. The production figures
are estimates of the overall importance of each variety in the major
countries of the world during the 25 year period. Argentina is the only
major producing country not included in this calculation.
Almost all of the major varieties during this period were bred prior
to 1940. Most of them are examples of the third stage in breeding pro-
gress. The widespread planting of the Java (P.O.J) and Indian (Co.)
varieties is evident. Barbados, the British West Indies station, and
Hawaii also have produced varieties which have been used extensively in
other countries. Only one native variety, Badila, had any commercial
importance during this period. A number of important parent varieties
and grandparent varieties were not important commercial varieties during
the 1940-64 period. The P.O.J. 2364 variety was never a significant
commercial variety, but it has been important as a parent to P.O.J. 2878
and several other varieties.
Table 1.4 indicates the importance of Coimbatore and Java stations
in the generation of new varieties. The Java station has been especially
productive of parent and grandparent varieties. Almost all of the parent8
and grandparent varieties were produced in Java, Barbados, India, Hawaii
and British Guiana -- the successful Stage 11 and 111 stations. A number
of additional stations such as Cuba, Canal Point, (Florida) Queensland,
6/
South Africa, Taiwan, Mauritius,- Brazil, British Honduras, Puerto





period under concern had been 1955-65 instead of 1940-64,
group of stations would have had more importance because, by
most of the varieties produced in most countries were
locally developed. Table 1.2 illustrates this point. Queensland, South
Africa, Puerto Rico, and Louisiana are stations which dld not flgma
importantly in the Stage 11 and 11[ breeding work. ‘rhev did taut and
select Stage 11 and 111 varieties from other countria~. In resent yonra
they have produced new varieties that have become increasingly importsnt
to their own sugarcane economies but, with one exception, have not been
widely distributed to other countries. The exception is the variety
N:Co. 310, bred in South Africa and later planted extensively in
Taiwan.
The shift from early Taiwan varieties to N:Co. 310 in 1960 is
evident from Table 1.2. It is also evident that Taiwan again was pro-
ducing important local varieties by 1965. Hawaii, like India and Java
has been planting almost its entire acreage to its own varietim for a
number of years. Mauritius produced some Stage II varieties, then
dropped out in Stage III, but has participated in Stage IV.International Transmission ~Varietal Chanues
Reference to Table 1.3 indicates that the varieties of the major
Stage 11 and 111 stations were in commercial production in many countries
other than their country of origin. What
that the experiment station itself was an
national transmission of the P.O.J., Co.,
Indian varieties.
The South African case is instructive
dustry had its beginnings in South Africa
is not obvious, however, is
important factor in the inter-
Hawaiian, and British West
in this regard. The sugar in-
in 1849. Prior to 1880 several
wild varieties imported from Java, Mauritius, and Indian were cultivated.
A wild variety, Uba, was introduced in 1883 and proved to be more dis-
ease-resistant than the other varieties. For a period of fifty years
it was the only important variety grown.
Some experimentation was carried on by planters to ,find new vari-
eties during this fifty-year period. A number of potentially-important
Stage 11 and 111 varieties actually existed. However, it was not until
an experiment station was financed by the growers and established at
Mt. Edgecumbe that these Stage II and III varieties from Java and India
were introduced. From 1925 until 1945 the accomplishments of this sta-
tion were entirely confined to the introduction of new disease-resistant
Stage III varieties, mostly from Java and India.
The percentage of the South African crop consisting of these new
varieties rose from 3.3 percent in 1933-34 to 95.5 percent in 1942-43,
nine years later. An analysis of yield increases indicates that the
new varieties introduced by 1945 outyielded the old Uba variety by
7/
about 27 percent.-142
The.ve.first N:C{Ivarieties were bred in India but the selections .,
for commercial plantinq ‘.;crc Lode in South Africa. By 1947 the ex-
periment station had produced its first South African variety, N:Co.
310. We have already noted that this variety cane to be commercially
produced in four other countries, most notably ii’Taiwan (a rarity for
a Stage IV cane variety), Table 1.3. It, along with several additional
N:CO varieties, occupied 78 percent of the planted acreage in South
Africa by 1960, Table 1.2, A yield”comparison over a five year period
of the N:CO varieties with the Stage 111 varieties from India and Java,
which they substantially replaced, showed a 28 percent advantage for
8/ the locally-bred canes.-
The South African experience with respect to the international
transmission of the Stage II and III varieties (especially from Java
and India) was repeated in most other cane-producing countries which
had not developed Stage II and 111 varieties. The experiment stations
in Queensland, Puerto Rico, Taiwan, Mauritius and several other
countries were instrumental in the testing and introduction of these
varieties into their local economies. The exhaustive collection and
testing of varieties from other countries also served to provide a
basis for thedevelopment of breeding programs in these newer stations.
In more recent years the Stage IV varieties have dominated produc-
tion in most countries. A limited number of these varieties are trans-
ferred to other countries. An important element of international trans-
mission of technological change remains, however, Genetic materials in
the form of newly-selected seedlings,, collections of wild canes and11
parent stock varieties of proven merit are freely exchanged between sta-
tions. In addition, the technical knowledge regarding improved breeding
techniques, superior genetic parent stock, and more efficient selection
methods also is exchanged.
Intra-country Transmission ~ Varietal Chanaes
The South African case again is informative regarding the adoption
of new varieties within a given sugar economy. The organization of the
industry in South Afr,i’ta is similar to the organization in a number of
countries. Most planters have large acreages (200-1,000 acres) with
substantial capital investment. Planters have highly-structured rela-
tionships with the processing mills and are well organized. One would
expect an organization of planters which supports an experiment station
to adopt new varieties developed by that station rather quickly. This
appears to have been the case in South Africa and in most other
countries. This rapid adoption is heightened by a sense of interna-
tional competition in achieving comparative advantage in sugarcane
production.
In South Africa the variety CO. 331 was introduced in 1946-47 and
reached its highest proportion of planted acreage (25 percent) only
eight years later. N:Co. 310 was introduced in 1948-49 and reached its
maximumproportion of planted acreage (60 percent) nine years later.
Given that the average age of old cane when ploughed out and replanted
in South Africa is now six years, this would seem to be extremely rapid
adoption. In fact, planters altered their usual cropping pattern in12
,many cases by ploughing out old cane varieties earlier than usual in
order to plant new varieties.
In Australia, each of the varieties, Q50, Pindar, Trojan, and P40SJ.
2%78 reached a maximumproportion of planted acreage (25 percent) approx- ..
imately 10 years after introduction. In Puerto Rico, BH 10-12, intro-
duced in 1920, reached a maximumproportion of approximately 25 percent
fifteen years later. However, PR 980, a locally-bred variety introduced
in 1955, had reached a proportion of almost 50 percent only ten years
later.
This rapid adoption of new varieties does not necessarily hold for
all sectors of the sugar-producing economy. The Indian and native
planters in South Africa produced yields only two thirds as high as the
European planters’ yields in 1959. The small holder planters in Java
and other countries also have lower yields than the estate or planta-
tion planters. This is not necessarily a consequence of slower adop-
tion of new varieties. India, a country with many small growers, has
also experienced relatively rapid adoption of varieties. For example,
in 1960 varieties Co. 527 and Co. 449 accounted for 6 and 1 percent of
the acreage of Andra Pradish. Seven years later the proportions were
14 and 8 percent, respectively. LTQ7
Effects ~Suaar Trade
Table 1.5 presents trade data for sugar. It should be noted that
roughly 40 percent of the world’s sugar production is from sugar beets.
With the exception of limited trading of beet sugar between Eastern
European countries , world trade figures reflect movements of cane sugar~13
The beet sugar production is important in the trade picture because
virtually every beet-producing country has instituted a tariff and/or
quota system to protect the domestic beet industry. The cost of such
protection is high and has increased in recent years because of the ’rela-
tively more rapid technological advances in sugarcane production.
Much sugar is traded under specific agreements between cooperating
countries. Prior to 1961 the largest importing country, the United
States, imported the bulk of its needs from Cuba, the largest export-
ing country. Since 1961 this U.S.
States has allocated Cuba’s former
shifted her exports to Communist -
- Cuban trade has ceased. The United
quota to other countries. Cuba has
bloc countries. The United Kingdomt
the world’s second leading importer, also has agreements with several
exporting countries.
From time to time, International Sugar Agreements have been negoti-
ated among countries in an attempt to control trade and production.
They have been only partially effective. The “free” world market for
sugar often has been a residual “dumping” market, and price changes have
been volatile.
‘l’he data in Table 1.1 and 1.5 suggest a relationship between changes
in sugarcane yields and changes in quantities exported by the major ex-
porting countries. Five exporting countries, South Africa,
Australia, Argentina and Taiwan had yield increases ranging
percent to 41 percent between the five-year 1948-52 average
year 1958-67 average. These five countries increased their






increase in exports was 103 percent of the 1950 average production in I
these countries.
A second group of six countries, Philippines, Brazil, Peru, Indonesia,
Mauritius and the Dominican Republic experienced yield increases ranging
9/
from 10 to 20 percent in this period.- Their average annual exports in-
creased by 2,079,000 short tons, 44 percent of their 1950 average produc-
tion. Only the Philippines had an export increase, (65 percent) of the
order of magnitude of any of the five high-yield-increase countries.
Cuba, on the other hand, experienced an actual yield decline for the
10/
same period and displayed an almost constant average export volume.—
This evidence supports the contention that shifts in comparative
advantage have been reflected in the world sugar trade. This relation-
ship is apparent even though world sugar trade has been dominated by
(1) inter-country agreements, (2) shifts in the position of co~eting
crops, and (3) changes in the degree of protection offered domestic
11/
beet sugar industries.—
T& Benefits From Suaarcan~Technoloaical ChanaR
The advances in productivity in the production of sugarcane have
been rapid and valuable. However, the actual benefits are difficult
to assess for each country. Presumably, each importing, non-producing
country receives a -straightforward benefit which can be seen as a fall
in the real price of sugar or, more accurately, a downward shift in the
supply schedule facing them. The supply schedule faced by domestic
users is not allowed to shift in every importing country because of the ,
protection offered domestic beet producers. Gains do occur in the form15
of higher import duty collections or higher prices to favored exporting
countries.
To the producing countries, relative rates of technical change
matter greatly. For many producing countries, a good crop alternative
to sugarcane does not exist. Producer groups have been keenly aware of
their competitive position with respect to world trade. This partially
explains why sugarcane growers
to privately finance their own
An exporting country which
technical change in production
factor or resource payments it
in almost every country have been willing
experiment stations. Q/
experiences a relatively slow rate of
also will experience a reduction in the
receives unless it has some agreement
with qn importing country to maintain the price it receives. The
country which can achieve a rate of technical change which is faster
than its competitors will increase its economic return to the factors
and resources which it owns.
The development of sugarcane technology is interesting in that it
differs in several important respects from the development of technology
in other agricultural crops. First, the development of modern technology ~
in this crop came relatively early. Much of it had occurred by the 1930’s.
The comparable developments in hybrid corn and wheat, for example, came
somewhat later.. However, some of the development in rice production
took place at about the same time.
Second, the countries which made the first major contributions were
not highly-developed countries. Clearly, India and Java were the two
leading countries in the early stages of cane-breeding. Finally, the,.. .
conditions for international transfer of technology were more favorable
in sugarcane than in most other agricultural crops. The early Stage 11
varieties were transferred easily. New cultural practices were not re-
quired. Only information about the relative profitability of producing
the new variety was needed.
Stage III varieties were more difficult to transfer because know-
Iedge.about specific disease resistance was required. Many new experi-
ment stations (8s well as the established stations) contributed to the
transfer of these Stage 111 varieties. In South Africa, as we have
seen, the introduction of Stage 111 varieties from other countries in-
creased average yields by 27 percent. If one wished to attribute this
yield increase to the experiment station efforts, a handsome return to
such investment can be calculated. M/
It is difficult to determine the proper allocation of benefits in a
case where the varieties were developed in one station, but another sta-
tion was required
simply has caused
and a value could
for their adoption. Presumably, the second station
the varieties to be adopted earlier than otherwise,
be placed on this.
The Stage IV cane-breeding activity is somewhat more straightforward
in terms of the allocation of benefits. Each station typically produces
varieties planted only in the region where the station is located.
Shifts in the production function and supplY curve do yield benefits to
the producing country which can be attributed to the breeding effort of
14/
the local station.—17
An additional complication is added to the assessment of benefits
when one considers the possibility that international transfer of tech-
nology means that an experiment station may not only shift the produc-
tion and supplY functions of its own economy, but the production and
supply functions of other economies as well. Thus the export country’s
own demand function for exports will shift, probably to the left,
The Java case is an excellent example of this. The Java station
was the leading generator of new varieties from 1900 to 1930. During
most of this period, Java was enjoying an increasing relative advantage
over other producihg countries, including India, which was also a lead-
ing generator of new varieties, but whose own varieties were often
better suited to other tropical countries than to northern India where
much of her production was located, A “technology gap” had been created
and reached its widest point around 1930. Yet Java was particularly
susceptible to the demand ei’feet of this international transmission of
her own varieties because of her position as the major free-market
supplier. The demand for sugar declined in the early depression years
and Java bore the brunt of the reduction in world trade. Since then,
the transmission of the Java (and other Stage II and III) varieties
reduced the technological gap. A general “catching-up” phase has all
but eliminated the gap today.
The benefits from the new varieties of sugarcane were not entirely
confined to cane yield increases. In general, the introduction of stage
II and 111 varieties resulted in a substantial improvement in the sugar



















Table 1.2. --Percent of sugarcane acreage planted to varieties developed
by the experiment station of selected countries and years,
1930-1965
Country 1930 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965
- percent -
Queensland 20 20 33 54 83 85 85
Hawaii 50 65 82 100 100 100 100
South Africa O 0 0.3 49 78
Taiwan 32 46 56 10 4 42
Puerto Riao o 9 12 10 3 35 50
Mauritius 8 53 98 93 78
Louisiana o 23 52 77 65 65
Source: --* Bureau of Su9ar Experi~nt Stationst
Queensland, various issues, 1928-1964. ‘
Proceedings &f Twelfth (jgnar~, International Society
of Sugarcane Techtiologists, NewYork, 1967. pp. 867, 1041.
cultu~~~ aarcan~~ Suaa~ Productio~~ Louisiana,










































Table 1.6.--Tons of sugarcane needed per ton of sugar, five-year
averages, selected years
1903- 1913-- 1923- 1933- 1943- 1953- 1963-



















































Source: _!?QI!@* Bureau Of Sugar Experi~nt StatiOnS~ Queensland
annual reports 1900-1964.
International Suaar Situation, USDABureau of Statistics
Bulletin 30j,1904i. —
-Statistics @~gtq, Vol. 1, revised, USDAStatistical
Bulletin 214, 1957.
Agricultural Statistics, USDA,U.S. Gov. Pl?iut,imf$ Office,
Washington, D. C., various issues.
Indian Suaar Manual, The Sugar Technologists’ Association of
India, Kalyanpur, Kanpur, 1962.
Proceedings ~~Ninth Conaress, Vol. I, International
Society of Sugarcan=hnologists, New Delhi, 1956.




One of the most dramatic episodes in the long history of banana pro-
duction and trade in the Central American tropics has been the develop-
ment and international diffusion of new technologies in response to
devastating inroads of the Panama disease in bananas. In the 20-year
period following World War 11, two major technological developments
stand out. The first is the selection, diffusion, and adoption of
disease-resistant banana varieties. The second is the invention and
application of processing and handling techniques specifically designed
to accommodate the physical and economic attributes of the new vari-
eties.
The economic impact of this episode on other
banana farms and plantations were not ravaged by
exporting nations whose
Panama disease illus-
trates side effects that can occur when important technological change
directly affects only some producers of an internationally-traded com-
modity.
Post-War Settinq
During World War II, international trade in bananas shrunk drastic-
ally because of the extreme shortage of refrigerated, ocean-going ships.
But as shipping became available after the war, banana production and
exports rebounded quickly, attaining prewar levels by the 1948-52 period,
Table 11.1.
Banana exports from Central America dominated the world trade pic-
ture, accounting for about half the total in 1948-52. Most of these28
Central American shipments went to the United States and Canada. (At
this time the United States purchased about two-thirds of all the world’s
banana exports. ) But largely because of rising banana production in
Ecuador, South American exports surpassed their prewar levels in the
1948-52 period.
International banana prices were relatively high in this period,
and the stage seemed to be set for orderly and profitable growth in the
world banana market. United Fruit Company and Standard Fruit and Steam-
ship Company; the two major fully-integrated banana producing and mar-
keting firms operating in the American tropics, resumed activities on
much the same basis as before the war by re-activating and adding to
their war-idled resources. These two U.S.-based firms had operated
plantations, export facilities, and a host of community services
(roads, railroads, schools, hospitals, etc.) in Central America since
the early 1900’s. The United Fruit Company was by far the larger of
the two firms. Their combined banana output accounted for all but a
16/
small portion of Central American production.— Together, United
Fruit and Standard Fruit held some 90 to 95 percent of the U.S. import”
market during the 1948-52 period.
Over the years, these two companies, especially United Fruit, had
conducted long-range, research programs on banana production and market-
ing technology. The financing of these continuing programs has varied
over time as circumstances in the industry have changed. But the re-
search done by these firms is both basic and applied. In fact, much of
the world’s scientific and practical knowledge about bananas has been
generated by these privately-sponsored research programs..,’
Mm!?!!l M!2!M!2
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Bananas are subject to a hDst ofdt?adly plant diseases.
most now can be controlled, several diseases, at one time or
Although
another,
have threatened the very existence of l~~ge.areas of commercial farms
dnd plantations. For examplet in the 1930°s the rapid spread of
sigatoka disease, a wind-borne leaf desta%yirn(j fungus, decimated large
banan8 tracts in Central America. It threatened to wipe out the whole
industry. However, frantic research mqinly,%$ United Fruit Company
technicians’ up,povered an effective }rqp,tq~~~ based on periodic applica- ~f ..~ ,’ ,.
tions of Bdr~eaux mixture suspended’ i$ttit& @$, p. 154&T BY 1939,
most large banana plantations were equipped Witti elaborate, permanent
W %pH&Xico, where large- networks of pipes and spray facilitie$~
scale sigatoka control was not undertaken p&r$l@because of the small
siza of individual banana farms, this disease virtually killed off the
banana industry by 1950.
But no really effective treatment has yet been found for Panama
disease. ‘.l%isso~l=borne fun~,us (fhsarium wilt] invades the soil,
.,,,
attacks tlii#root./s@t&kof the sds~e~tihle plbnt, and causes a break-
,.”
down in the””vaq~ula~,f~w of water and nutrieiits. ~7, Chap. 1~~ The
., .,
result is stunti’ng’;and eventual@& t$bction oh t@ infected plant.
Though Panama disease spreads more S1OW1Y than sigatoka, the organism
remains indefinitely in the soil, rendering infected areas useless for
future production of susceptible varieties.
Panama disease does not attack all varieties of bananas; some are
highly resistant. However, the Gros Michel variety is quite susceptible.30
This variety is the traditional commercial banana of Central and South
America. Its handling, ripening, and flavor qualities have long been
prized by banana men, But it has not been possible to develop a Gros
Michel banana with disease resistance. Because the banana is, botani-
cally, a giant herb growing from an underground rhizome, cross breeding,
and other known techniques of producing new varieties having selected
characteristics of existing varieties are very difficult to apply.
Efforts to “purify” infected acreage by flooding it with water for
periods up to a year have proven only temporarily effective. This
technique, known as flood fallowing, is very costly and provides im-
munity from re-infection from only one to five years, depending on soil
type and other environmental factors.
Panama disease was identified and widely-known in tropical America
as early as 1900. Its spread was gradual but inexorable throughout the
region’s banana lands. BYWorld War II, only a few areas, notably
Ecuador and Colombia, seemed relatively free of the disease. Since no
effective treatment could be found, the spread of the disease was
partially offset by abandonment of infected areas. Newplantings were
then established on previously uncultivated sites. This was a workable
practice until the post-World War II period when banana production began
to exceed pre-war levels.
BY the 1948-52 period, Panama disease was pervasive, especially in
Central America. Relocating and replanting whole farms and plantations
had become prohibitively costly. In addition, good disease-free banana
land, accessible to existing handling and shipping facilities, was31
becoming very scarce. United Fruit Company has estimated that since
1900, some 925 thousand acres of banana land has been abandoned mostly
because of Panama disease. This averages about 14 thousand acres per
year. These average annual abandonments amounted to about 10 percent
of United Fruit’s owned and controlled banana acreage in the early
1950’s. For instance, United Fruit’s Quepos Division in Costa Rica
had about 25 thousand acres in banana production in 1947. BY 1956,
Panama disease had wiped out all production.
Officials of both United Fruit and Standard Fruit were extremely
reluctant to consider abandoning the Gros Michel banana even though
the ravages of Panama disease had reached a critical stage, and re-
search on feasible control methods was not especially promising.
~Critical Staae
We can consider the 1948-52 period as the start of the critical
stage in the Central American banana industry’s confrontation with
Panama disease. From this period into the middle and late 1950’s the
area’s banana production and exports dropped. The data in Table 11.2
indicate the downward slide in acreage from 1948-52 to 1958-62. The
stagnation in Central American exports in this period is indicated by
the data in Table 11.1. Abandonments mainly due to Panama disease ex-
ceeded replanting in three of the four major producing countries;
Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Only Panama showed increased
acreage. There, a 12 thousand acre flood fallow and replanting program
was begun by United Fruit Company in 1950. This experiment was designed32
to revive one of the company’s plantations which had lain idle since
Panama disease wiped out production in 1936.
The charts in figure 1 show banana exports for these four nations
18/ annually and as a five year moving average for about 30 years.— The
drop exports that can be attributed mainly to inroads of Panama disease
is shown between the vertical dotted lines. Even in Panama, where the
production and export trend was generally increasing in
major export drop occurred between 1950 and 1952 as the
and replanting program got underway.
the 1950’s, a
flood fallow
As Central American production faltered in the 1950’s, exports from
other sources expanded substantially, Table 11.1 Banana exports from
Ecuador and Colombia in South America are most relevant in this expan-
sion. Almost all other major banana exporters operate under the protec-
tion of preferential arrangements with major importers (e.g., Jamaica
and Windward Island with the United Kingdom, Guadaloupe and Martinique
with France, the Canary Islands with the Spanish mainland). The dramatic
surge of Ecuadorian and Colombian banana shipments to replace lagging
Central American exports is shown in figure 2.
As mentioned previously, both Ecuador and Colombia produced mainly
the Gros Michel variety, but were relatively free of Panama disease in
this period. Colombian bananas were shipped mainly to Western Europe,
and up to two-thirds of Ecuador’s exports came to the United States
where, by 1959, they accounted for over 40 percent of all U.S. banana
imports. Ecuadorian bananas easily filled the gap left by the dwindling
supplies and rising costs of Central American bananas. Growing markets,
.33
Figure 1: Volume of banana exports from four
Central American Countries; annually and five-
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Figure 2: Volume of banana exports from Ecuador
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Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations.35
abundant land, and government encouragement fueled this tremendous out-
put growth. The major banana companies, United Fruit and Standard Fruit,
participated in this Ecuadorian expansion mainly as shipping and market-
ing agents -- United Fruit’s single small producing division in that
country was expropriated in the early 1960’s. Since then, the Ecuadorian
government has effectively discouraged the formation of additional
foreign-controlled plantations.
A number of smaller exporting and marketing firms, operating with
Ecuadorian supplies, flourished during this period. As a result, the
combined U.S. market share of the two integrated, producing-marketing
companies dropped to about 70 percent in 1959. Ecuadorian banana
quality was uneven, seasonal variations in output were sharp. In addi-
tion, an export tax was levied, and shipping charges exceeded those for
Central American Fruit. Yet the demand for Ecuadorian bananas surged
ahead as the Central American producers struggled with Panama disease.
Given the state of the arts during the early portion of this
critical stage, it seemed likely that, barring a massive Panama disease
outbreak, Ecuador soon might corner the relatively open banana markets
in North America,,Western Europe, and elsewhere. Without a major cost-
reducing shift in banana production technology, the invested capital,
land resources, production knowledge, and quality-control skill of the
integrated companies in Central America might become virtually worth-
less. Moreover, an ’important source of vital foreign exchange and tax
19/ The revenue for the four Central American nations would wither.—
companies and their host governments were in trouble with bananas, and
they knew it.36
Resistant Varieties: Selection and Adoption
Although the Central American trade was built on Gros Michel bananas,
a number of Panama-resistant varieties were known to scientists and grown
commercially in other areas. The banana industries of Jamaica, French
West Indies, Canary Islands, Australia, and others, were based on re-
sistant varieties belonging to the Cavendish group. These varieties hed
been shunned by the major producing companies because of supposedly
lower yields, poorer handling and ripening qualities, and somewhat
different management requirements. Another important factor, no doubt,
was simply internal resistance to change within the companies. The
firms’ producing, shipping and marketing divisions knew, with precision,
how to grow, transport, and merchandise Gros hlichel. Much would have
to be relearned if new varieties were adopted.
Resistance to a variety switch eroded faster in the smaller Standard
Fruit and Steamship Company. A major management change in 1953 and the
existence of smaller disease-free land reserves under company control
in producing areas contributed to this attitude change. By 1957,
Standard had planted 14-15 thousand acres in bananas of the Cavendish
group. These varieties were selected by researchers from those avail-
able in the Caribbean, Africa, and elsewhere. Over time, Standard
Fruit researchers focused their attention on one of these varieties,
the Giant Cavendish.
In 1960, United Fruit Company botanists began to look seriously at
a disease-resistant variety called the Valery which was being grown on
the firm’s experimental farm in Honduras. This plant has been collected37
originally in Vietnam by a company expedition several years earlier.
In 1962 a major company decision was made to move rapidly into Valery
plantings. Even with the problems of multiplying and distributing new
seed stock, virtually all production by Standard and the majority of
United’s was in disease-resistant varieties by 1965,
Once begun, the adoption and diffusion of Giant Cavendish and
Valery bananas spread quickly. However, this pattern of development
and rapid diffusion of disease-resistant varieties should not be inter-
preted as a clear indication that rapid technical change in tropical
agriculture is most likely in sectors or industries dominated by large
plantations and vertically-integrated firms capable of internal research
and development. The diffusion process in the Central American banana
chse was indeed rapid. But the long delay by the managements of the
major companies in selecting, adopting, and marketing resistant strains
was nearly disastrous for them. On the other hand, the shift to
Cavendish type bananas already had occurred in the Western Indian banana
industries of Jamaica, Windward Islands, Guadaloupe -- Martinique --
areas where small holders and public research facilities predominate.
Diffusion of Giant Cavendish and Valery bananas in Central America
was spurred not only by the monolithic decision structures of the two
large firms but because of several unexpected advantages with the new
fruit which were not apparent at first. As the new varieties were put
into commercial production in the Central American lowlands -- probably
the world’s best overall banana-growing environment -- per acre yields
20/ were higher than anticipated and even higher than Gros Michel yields.—..........-- =. —... ...—.— .......... —. —.—.. . .—. — ...—.-.. -..... - ...---.. — ...-—---- -.-.—-. ...,...-——. -. ,-.—._-. —.—
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Heavier bunches and higher planting densities contributed to this
yield advantage. Because the new varieties are lower-growing, the con-
stant danger of losses due to wind-caused “blow-downs” is reduced below
that for the lankier Gros Michel plants.
al Though it had always been
generally assumed that the Gros Michel was the best-tasting banana in
world commerce, some test results in the United States in the early
1960’s showed that properly-handled and properly ripened Valery bananas
were distinctly superior in flavor and aroma to Gros Michel.
There was a major problem with the new varieties about which the
skeptics had been correct. Bananas of the Cavendish group were not
well suited to the commercial methods of handling and shipping then in
use. In the 1950’s and early 1960’s bananas from Central and South
America were still handled as whole stems (bunches) from the moment of
harvest until ripening was completed in the importing country. Indivi-
dual stems, protected by only a thin plastic film bag, were handled up
to a dozen separate times en route to the wholesale fruit dealer. The
Gros Michel is well-suited to this system. However, the individual
fingers of fruit on the new varieties are more easily bruised in the
green stage than with Gros Michel. Furthermore, the banana clusters on
the new varieties do not lie as close to the stem’s center stalk as on
the Gros Michel. Hence, they are more easily damaged. With all the
handling of exposed stems built into traditional techniques, quality
control with the new varieties was very difficult in comparison with
the established Gros Michel.39
When the first yields of the new varieties were coming onto the North
American market, Standard Fruit Company encountered severe quality prob-
lems. Outright rejections on arrival were quite high. In addition,
prices for the new variety fruit were discounted by wholesale buyers be-
cause many banana quality problems do not show up until the fruit is
22/
fully ripened and ready for retail merchandising.— Standard’s response
to these quality control problems probably saved the company and set off
a market-induced technological shift that is revolutioninzing banana
handling in virtually all international markets.
Trooical Boxinq
During the reign of the Gros Michel in Central and South America,
virtually all shipments to North American and European markets were
cargoes of stem fruit. Bananas remained on the stem until the ripening
process was completed in local markets by specialized ripeners, whole-
sale fruit jobbers, and chain stores. These establishments, of which
there were about 1,600 in the United States in 1955, also cut the indivi-
dual clusters (hands) from the stem, packed them in returnable cartons,
and merchandised them to retailers. So in addition to ripening and re-
tail distribution, these firms performed an important sorting, grading,
and packaging function.
In the early 1960’s, Standard Fruit began to experiment with the
system of cutting, washing, sorting, and packaging individual clusters
into 40-pound labeled cardboard boxes in the tropics near their produc-
tion and shipping facilities. The boxed fruit was then shipped to
wholesale buyers in the importing country. Under this system, ripeners40
in the importing country relinquished the cutting and packing function
and part or all of the sorting and grading function. They retained the
ripening and retail distribution functions. Acceptance of this innova-
tion was unexpectedly rapid in many parts of the U.S. market.
Boxed bananas are more easily handled with typical rail, truck, and
warehouse machiner, and, in boxes, the new variety fruit is less likely
to be bruised. Like all other firms in the food marketing sector,
ripeners and jobbers were under severe economic pressure to become
larger and more efficient. With boxed bananas, they found that they
could reduce per unit costs by eliminating a series of labor-intensive
processes and increase the volumes handled. In addition, retaiIers
were pleased with the non-returnable , one-way cardboard carton. From
the producing company’s viewpoint, more fruit could be salvaged all
slang the way since, under the old system, whole stems had to be dis-
carded if a single cluster was damaged or had become prematurely yellow.
Moreover, the specialized loading and unloading equipment at the sea-
ports was still usable, with some modification, for boxed fruit.
Further experience has shown that boxed bananas can be stowed more
efficiently in refrigerated cargo ships, and elimination of the center
stalk which is about 15 percent of the weight of stem bananas reduces
the shipping costs per unit of usable fruit.
The demand by wholesalers for boxed bananas grew so rapidly in the
United States that Unit Fruit Company, which was still shipping Gros
Michel in 1962, was forced to develop its own tropic boxing facilities
even before its Valery production began. Smaller independent importers,41
buying on the Ecuadorian market, began to establish boxing facilities in
and near the producing regions in order to supply their U.S. customers
with boxed fruit, even though their bananas were also Gros Michel variety.
In a matter of only four years, boxed bananas went from an insignificant
pdrtion of the U.S. market to a majority of all imports, Table 11.3.
The trend toward tropic boxing of export fruit is being accelerated
in Ecuador. In response to new inroads of Panama disease in Gros Michel
plantings, the Ecuadorian government has prohibited new plantings of this
susceptible variety. &3, p. 2fl Only varieties from the Cavendish
group may be used for new farms or for replanting existing farms.
Standard Fruit Company adopted the tropical boxing technology in
order to offset quality and handling problems stemming from its earlier
decision to adopt the disease-resistant variety. United Fruit and the
others adopted the boxing technology much earlier than they would have
had to on purely technical grounds. The economic impact of the boxing
technology on retail and wholesale channels required Standard Fruit’s
competitors to begin trop:
market position. Several
cutting, sorting, and box:
c boxing in order to maintain their previous
int@mediate production processes, namely
ng were shifted from the developed importing
nation to the less-developed producing and exporting nations. In addi-
tion, new box-making plants are operating or are being established in
Central America and Ecuador.
Economic Impacts
An economist looking at the impact of the disease-resistant varieties
. “ ____ , A—._:-.. --..1A ..-”..A *he+ ~~ P..nm. dismtse snread throtiah the42
region, the production function for bananas based on traditional inputs
shifted slowly but surely downward. Output per unit of the usual inputs
eroded at all levels of input application. The main objective of early
decisions to adopt new varieties seems to have been to halt this erosion
of the function and to stabilize it, even if stabilization was achieved
at lower output levels than with Gros Michel. But as the resistant vari-
eties were adopted in the lush Central American banana zone, experience
suggested that the production function might be restored to pre-disease
levels and perhaps even beyond them. The extent of this shift is not
yet fully known. HoweVer, it seems likely that the adoption of new
varieties will result in a net increase in the production function for
Central American bananas as compared with disease-free Gros Michel out-
put relationships.
The erosion of banana production relationships in
throughout the 1950’s no doubt strengthened Ecuador’s
Central America
comparative ad-
vantage in banana production and export. This shift in comparative
advantage was accelerated by deteriorating production relationships and
prices for Ecuadorian cacao and by slow growth in that nation’s coffee-
producing industry. ~6, Chap. 2~T Much of the banana boom in Ecuador
during this period can be attributed to this alteration in comparative
advantage vis-a-vis Central America. Adoption of new varieties has
apparently halted this trend and, in fact, may be instrumental in re-
storing Central America to its pre-eminent position in the world banana
trade.43
Tropical boxing of bananas was undertaken initially to facilitate
the shift to new varieties. The main objective was to maintain quality
and reduce waste and transit loss. in effect, the boxing of bananas
near the production area was at first a method of sustaining the pro-
duction function, in terms of output of marketable fruit, at levels
higher than otherwise would have been the case. The rapid adoption
of this new technique in the producing areas where Gros Michel still
ruled indicates that it is a net cost-reducing procedure for bananas
moving into the relatively sophisticated marketing channels of North
America and Western Europe.
] The economic impact of tropical boxing is to shift the locus of
several intermediate handling and processing functions from the mar-
keting system of the importing nation to the tropical producing areas.
Furthermore, it alters the nature of the actual product moving in
international commerce from an essentially unprocessed primary product
to a commodity which is substantially closer to the final product. sold
to consumers.
Some calculations for 1963, when stem and boxed bananas shared the
U.S. market about equally, indicate that on an equivalent basis, in
terms of usable fruit, boxed banana import prices received by major
,’
importers were about 13 percent higher than stem prices. About $1.00
,..
per hundredweight ofjthe approximately $10.00 of value added to:boxed
bananas from harvest to retail was transferred from establishments in
23/
the U.S. to establishment~ in producing areas.— Though this is only
a rough approximation, it dhes indicate that, in terms of foreign44
exchange earnings and jobs, tropical boxing is a significant international
shift in handling technology.
The development of box-making and assembly plants in the producing
areas, though still in its early stages, has and can be expected to in-
crease employment and economic growth in those areas. New capital for
banana carton factories in Central and South America ran above $50 mil-
lion in the 1960-66 period. This added industrial activity is a direct
result of the adoption and diffusion of the banana boxing technology.
It is clear that the resurgence of the Central American banana in-
dustry in response to these two major innovations has slowed down and
altered the growth and development of the Ecuadorian industry. The ex-
port data illustrated in figure 2 indicate this began to occur in the
early 1960’s. A slow-down in export volume growth and continued down-
ward pressure on world prices have resulted in a stagnation in Ecuadorian
banana export earnings since about 1963. Banana exports and earnings for
Colombia, the other major South American supplier, continue to show only
slow growth as Central American boxed bananas become more and more com-
petitive in the European markets which have been Colombia’s major out-
lets.
The data in Table 11.4 show the exchange earnings and relative im-
portance of banana exports for Central America and Ecuador in three
periods: 1955-57, 1959-61, and 1964-66. The growth in other l?cuadorian
export industries has reduced that nation’s dependence on bananas some-
what since the peak period in 1959-61 and has helped to offset the shift
of comparative advantage in bananas back to Central America. Banana45
earnings in the 1960’s are generally increasing for all the major Central
Anrmican exporters except Guatemala. However, some new Valery plantings
by United Fruit Company in Guatemala are beginning to produce marketable
fruit. They will partially offset previous Panama-disease abandonments.
Dependence upon bananas for foreign exchange, while still extremely
important for several of these nations, especially Ecuador, Panama, and
Honduras, has declined for all since 1959-61 and for all but Ecuador
since 1955-57.
It appears that much of the future growth in the production and box-
ing of bananas will be focused in Honduras, Panama and Costa Rica.
These nations seem to provide the best overall environment for the pro-
duction of disease-resistant varieties and the packing and shipping of
24/
boxed bananas to world markets.— Both United Fruit and Standard
Fruit are engaged in major production-expanding programs with disease-
resistant varieties in Honduras. United Fruit, the only major exporter
of Panamanian bananas, is expanding its Valery output on fully-owned
plantations. In addition, United has been relatively successful with
an expanding associate producer progrdm. Associate producers grow
bananas under contract with United Fruit Company. They receive basic
services, facilities, and credit from the company, but must follow
specified production practices laid out by the company. Substantial
expansion of production in Costa Rica is being planned, especially by
Standard.
Banana prices in several major importing nations have been drift-
ing downward since the late 1950’s. Retail prices in the United States,46
Canada, and West Germany have dropped about 10 percent since 1958; “real”
prices of course have dropped further. L~2, p. 2~~ ~~1, p. @ Increased
supplies due to the new varieties and the adoption of tropical boxing have
intensified this long-run tendency for supplies to increase faster than
demand, and at least part of these price declines can be attributed to
technological changes. Measuring the price impact of these changes is
difficult, but perhaps the following is suggestive of the magnitudes.
Between 1965 and 1970, FAO has projected that world banana supplies
@6~ Approximately one third of this will increase about 40 percent. -
increase will come from Central America. If it is assumed that Central
American production would remain constant (or possibly decline) in the
absence of the technical innovations discussed here, then the effect of
these additional supplies on international banana prices is an approx-
imate measure of the price impact of technical change in this area. It
is only an approximation, of course, and probably an overestimation
since export supplies from other sources, principally Ecuador, probably
would have expanded faster than they actually will. In any case, the
additional supplies from Central America in the last half of the 1960’s
will exert a downward pressure on retail prices approximately equivalent
to 20 percent of 1965-66 levels. That is, in the absence of any expan-
sion in Central America and assuming all other export availabilities
remain as projected, then retail banana prices in world markets would
average in 1970 some 10 percent below 1965-66 levels. When the pro-
jected increase in Central American supplies is added, then average
retail prices some 30 percent below 1965-66 levels are requjred tobalance amounts demanded with projected export availabilities.
~?6, table ~~ Any supplY response to these lower prices naturally
would offset at least some of this indicated downward pressure on
retail prices. in addition, it is likely that consumers will benefit
not only from lower prices but also because average banana quality
can be expected to increase with increased tropical boxing in most
markets,
As in the past, economists and historians will continue to de-
bate the role and contribution of the banana industry to the growth
and development of tropical America. Their analyses will have to
encompass the long-run impacts of the diffusion and adoption of these



























Table 11.2 .--Acreages of exportable b nanas in Central America; five-
7 year averages 1948-196Z
Country 1948-1962 1953-1957 1958-1962
- thousand acres -
Guatemala 46.7 39.3 31.3
Honduras 55.8 53.5 43.5
Costa Rica 42.8 39.0 30.6
Panama 19.2 26.0 30.8
A/filajor companies and their associated growers only.
Source: Data supplied by major fruit companies.
f
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Sour ce: Estimated from data supplied by major importers.51
Table 11,4 .--Value of banana exports and percent of total exports
accounted for by banwsin four Central American countries
and Ecuador; 1955, 1961, 1966
Annual averaae
1955- 1959- 1964
Country 1957 1961 1966
Costa Rica —.
Banana exports (roil dollars) 26.1 20.1 28.6
Percent of total exports 34 25 24
Guatemala
Banana exports (roil dollars) 15.5 15.3 6,5
Percent of total exports 13 14 3
&onduras
Banana exports (roil dollars) 34.0 31.4 53.1
Percent of total exports 54 46 44
Panama
Banana exports (roil dollars) 24.3 20.6 37.8
Percent of total exports 72 67 48
Ecuador
Banana exports (roil dollars) 63.4 86.4 90.1
Percent of total exports 50 62 52
Source: International Financial Statistics, International ——
Monetary Fund, Vols. 15, 17, and 21, and U.S. Department
of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture Service.52
III. Rice&/
In this section an attempt is made to analyze the complex set of
technical and economic interactions associated with (1) the diffusion
of Japanese rice production technology to Taiwan and Korea, (2) the
impact of productivity growth in rice production on rice trade be-
tween Japan and Taiwan and Korea, and (3) the impact of rice imports
from these two colonial areas on rice prices and production in metro-
politan Japan. Specifically, we will test two hypothesis advanced by
several Japanese scholars. The first is that the transfer of rice
production technology from Japan to Taiwan and Korea was responsible
for the expansion of exports from the colonial areas to metropolitan
Japan. The second is that these exports in turn depressed rice prices
and dampened the growth of productivity and farm income in metropolitan
~/
Japan.
An alternative hypothesis which might be,advanced is that the
technical potential, in the form of biological and chemical innova-
tions, for continued rapid technical advance in Japanese agriculture
had not yet been created during the interwar period. This hypothesis
apparently has not been seriously examined in Japan,
Growth in Japanese Aariculturq -tip rodu~tivity ——
The rate of output and productivity growth in Japanese agricul-
ture has varied widely during the 100 years of “modernization” follow-
ing the start of the Meiji period in 1968. Four main periods, some-
times called “technical epochs”, are frequently identified, Table 111.1.53
The first is a period of rapid growth in output and productivity that
ended during the 1920’s. This was followed by a period of slower growth
during the interwar period. The third is a period of decline and re-
covery associated with World War II. A fourth period of explosive
growth in productivity began in the late 1940’s or early 1950’s.
f75, 20, 31, 35, 417
Output and productivity trends both for rice and for the total
agricultural sector appear to have followed the same general pattern,
27/ reflecting the dominant role of rice in the agricultural economy.—
The growth in output during the first technical “epoch” was achieved
through a combination of increases in land inputs and growth of land
productivity, Yield increases (land productivity) accounted for
approximately two-thirds of the increase. Yield increases were
achieved primarily through intensification of the “traditional” bio-
logical technology; that is, through (1) improved crop husbandry,
including more intensive use of labor, (2) increases in the application
of organic sources of plant nutrients (3) application of pre-Mendelian




(4) through land improvement projects -- principally the
paddy fields and improvement of water delivery and drain-
Institutions for the rapid diffusion
tural practices from the best farmers and
the 1880’s. This effort was complemented
of superior varieties and cul-
regions were developed during
by the development of pre-
fectural (local) experiment stations in the 1890’s. BY the end of the54
period the research effort was increasingly focused on the development
of a “fertilizer-consuming rice culture”. This involved the develop-
ment of rice varieties with shorter stems and more tillers. The appli-
cation of the more intensive rice production technology was facilitated
by small-scale land and water resource development. This contributed
.,
to expansion of’ the irrigated area and increased the precision of
water treatment.
The economic incentives for expansion of rice area and the adop-
tion of yield-improving technology were favorable throughout the first
epoch, Real rice prices rose, throughout the period, Tables 111.4 and
111.5. By 1900 rice exports, which had risen continuously since the
early 1870’s started to decline. Demand was increasing more rapidly




expand rice production in the northern island of Hokkaido
y-acquired colonial areas of Korea and Taiwan.
Productivity Growth in Korea and Taiwan .— ——
InitiaI efforts to increase rice production in Korea and Taiwan
through the transfer of Japanese rice varieties and Japanese cultiva-
28/
tion methods were relatively unsuccessful.—
In Korea, where the environment for rice cultivation was similar
to that in Japan, the transfer of Japanese varieties occurred rather
rapidly. BY thit;arly 1920’s approximately two-thirds of the rice area
in Korea was plnnted to Japanese varieties, Table 111.6. However, rice
yields in hi,rea {.Lidnot increase significantly until at least the mid-
1920’s (Table 111..7).55
In Taiwan the direct transfer of Japanese varieties was not
successful. Japanese rice varieties were not adapted to the Taiwan
ecology. Furthermore, the official economic policy emphasized expan-
sion of sugar production rather than rice production during the first
two decades of the colonial period. It was not until the mid-1920’s,
after 30 years of Japanese rule, that new varieties were developed.
These varieties incorporated the high yield potential of the Japanese
varieties with the superior adaptation to local conditions of the
29/
native indica varieties.— By the late 1930’s half of the total
rice area in Taiwan was planted to the new ponlai varieties developed
in Taiwan. The average Taiwan rice yield was approaching that in
Japan. This rapid diffusion was facilitated by extensive irrigation
development.
By the mid-1920’s, the increases in rice output in the colonial
areas resulted in substantially increased rice exports to Japan, Table
111.3, Japanese rice imports rose from an average of 559 metric tons
in 1912-20, 6.4 percent of total Japanese supplY, to 1,754 metric tons
in 1931-40, 15.6 percent of total supplY. During this latter period,
imports from Korea accounted for 9.6 percent and from Taiwan 5.5 per-
cent of the total Japanese rice supply,
In Taiwan, rice exports rose from an average of less than 20 per-




percent in 1931-40, Table 111.10. In Korea, exports
than 9 percent in 1912-16 to 30 percent in 1922-26,
,,56
The extent to which the increased rice exports from the two
colonial areas were a result of economic incentives generated in the
market rrr administrative pressures has not yet been analyzed. Although
data on consumption levels in the two colonial areas are subject to
considerable question it does seem clear that consumption of rice in
liore~ and Taiwan declined while exports to J~parr were rising. lrl
Taiwan, the per capita supply of rice available for local use declined
from 166.5 kilograms per capita in 1920-29 to 133.1 kilograms in 1930-
39. in Korea, per capita consumption of rice also appears to have de-
clined sharply while exports to Japan were rising. in contrast, rice
consumption in Japan during the 1930’s approximated the levels of
earlier years, Table 111.12.
W@!U&Q Imports u Japanese -t production, ~ productivity
The two decades from 1920 to 1940 have been characterized as a
period of relative stagnation in .Japanese agriculture. For 30 years
prj.or to World War 1, rice prices had risen steadily relative to the
general price level. Rice prices rose to their highest relative level
in 1913 and their highest absolute level in 1°19, Table 111.4 and
111..5. The wholesale price of rice in Tokyo more than doubled between
1913 and 19i9. Consumer riots occurred during the very sharp price rise
of 1916-19. In response to these official policies were designed to en-
courage rice production in and imports from the colonial areas.
Imports increased sharply in the mid-1920’s and remained above
1.2 million metric tons until after 1940, Table 111.12. l~rom 1921-40,
the price of rice did not resume its upward drift relative to ihe general57
price level. It fluctuated below the peak established in 1913. The
sharp decline in rice prices in the early 1930’s led to protests by
farmers against. imports. The government limited imports from the two
colonial areas in 1933 and again
averaged 1.9 million tnetric tons
World War 11 peak of 2.’2 million
What was the impact of rice
in 1936. Nevertheless, rice imports
in 1932-38, and reached their pre-
metric tons in 1938.
imports from Taiwan and Korea on rice
production, consumption, and prices in Japan during the interwar
period? The impact of imports depends upon the shape of the rice
demand and supply functions in Japan during this period.
Estimates of’ the price elasticity of demand computed by Ohkawa
from (1) data on rice consumpl!ion by income classes between 1931-32 and
1938-39 and (2) from market data between 1920 and 1938 center around
-0.20. f3# Recent income elasticity estimates, summarized by
Kaneda also appear consistent with a price elasticity for rice of
-0.20 in the 1920-40 period. ~5#
Estimates of supply elasticities in rice production are unavail-
able for Japan. The elasticity of supply depends on both the response
of area planted and the response of yield per unit area to changes in
the price of’ rice. Recent review of area supply elasticity studies
conducted in other Asian countries, indicati? that the area Tesponse
to changes in the price of’ rice typically falls in the ‘~0.20 to ‘~0.30
range. ~?~, 2~7 The yield of rice per unit area in Japan was appar-
ently highly responsive to the use of i“ertilizer, insecticides, and
other techr]ical inputs during this period. Estimates of the production58
function and the demand for fertilizer by Hayarni imply an elasticity of
yield with respect to price of between ~().~() and i-oO~5~ ~T3, 14_7
It seems reasonable, therefore, to hypothesize a total supplY elas- ‘
ticity for rice of approximately -t-o.50 in Japan between 1920-40,
With these two elasticity estimates it is possible to arrive at
an estimate of the impact of rice imports on Japanese rice production,
consumption, and price by constructing three, simple economic models
for the 1921-40 period, Table 111.13.
The first model, identified in Table 111.13 as “partial isolation
model (I)”, illustrates the impact of imports on rice prices when
(1) annual domestic production is the same as actually occurred in
the 1921-40 period -- this implies a completely inelastic supply func-
tion, (2) imports are held at the 1912-20 average level, and (3) the
price elasticity of demand is assumed to be -0.2. Under these condi-
tions rice prices would have risen to an average index of 140 for the
1931-40 period, 43 percent higher than the actual average index of 97
that prevailed during 1931-40.
The second model, identified as “partial isolation model (II)”,
illustrates the impact on rice prices when (1)
supplY is assumed to be +0.5, (2) imports are
average level, and (3) the price elasticity of
-0,2. It differs from partial isolation model
tion with respect to supplY elasticity. Under
prices would have risen to an average index of
the price elasticity of
held at the 1912-20
demand is assumed to be
(I) only in the assump-
these conditions, rice
107 for the 1931-40
period, 11 percent higher than the actual average index for the same
period.59
The third model, called the “isolation model”, illustrates the esti-
mated impact of imports on rice prices, production, and consumption when
(1) imports are assumed to have been prohibited in the 1921-40 period,
(2) the price elasticity of demand is assumed to be -0.2, and (3) the
price elasticity of supply is assumed to be +0.5. Under these condi-
tions the average 1931-40 price index would be 115. This is 19 percent
above the actual 1931-40 index of 97.
The prices generated by the “isolation model” are consistent with
an estimated rate of growth in rice production in Japan equal to that
30/
achieved during the first two decades of this century.— The “isolation
model” is therefore, consistent with the hypothesis referred to at the
beginning of this section; that imports of rice from Taiwan and horea
were responsible for the depressed rice prices and the slow growth of
31/ rice production in metropolitan Japan during the 1920-40 period.—
However, the data and analysis presented in this paper is inadequate
to reject the hypothesis that technical considerations also could have
dampened the rate of growth of output even if the calculated equilibrium
prices had been obtained.
The impact of the rice imports from Taiwan and Korea on Japanese
economic growth is less obvious than their impact on rice production
and prices. Clearly one major impact of’ these rice imports was to re-
verse the long-run tendency for terms of trade to shift in favor of
rice producers and turn it in favor of rice consumers. This contributed
to higher real incomes for urban consumers, increased the supplY of labor
in the nonfarm sector, and reduced pressures for wage increases in the6(1
industrial sector. One effect was probably to increase the competitive
position of Japanese industrial exports in world markets. A second
effect was to reduce the growth rate of purchasing power in rural areas.
This, in turn contributed to the slack in domestic private demand for
the industrial sector’s output. ~~(); pp. 419-44~7
The transfer of rice production technology from Japan to Taiwan
and Korea and the Japanese policy on imports from these two countries
during 1920-40 period has important implications for South and South-
east Asian countries for the rest of this century. Approximately two-
thirds of the world rice trade today is between Asian countries. Lx
Technical change in rice production, similar to the changes that took
place in Taiwan and Korea prior to World War 11, is underway in several
rice exporting and importing nations of Southeast Asia. Substantial
disruption of trade and price relationships are anticipated in the
absence of an effective international stabilization scheme.61
Table 111.1. --Annual percentage growth rates of output, inputs and
productivity in Japanese agriculture in four periods
:;$:~ I P~I~~711 P~m7111 P~;;;71v


































































- .44 -1.37 .85
- .45 4.25 -6.71
.64 -2,27 4.1462
Table 111,2. --Five-year averages of official and corrected paddy rice







Period estimates- (1) (2) (3)
yields in koku per tan of brown rice$!~
1873-1877 ---- ---- 1,500
1878-1882 1.166 1.264 1,549
1883-1887 1.297 1.355 1.599
1888-1892 1.420 1.425 1.651
1893-1897 1.371 1.371 1.705
1898-1902 1.516 1.516 1.760
1903-1907 1.626 1.626 1.817
1908_19~~ 1.734 1.734 1.876
1913-1917 1.843 1.843 1.937
1918-1922 1.927 1.927 2,000
annual average - percent -























~ihlinist,ry of Agriculture and Forestry, Agricultural Forestry
Economics Bureau, Statistical Section, Reported by Nakamura (27; pp. 66,
228-230).
~/~(~~ushi oh]{a~a, Q+ ~. Estimatgs@ Lonq Term Economic
Statistics ~ Japan Since 1868, Vol. 9, Tokyo, 196=. 67. ——
S/ (27; p. 92).
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Table 111,5.--Price indexes for rice and wholesale price index in Japan,
1911-1940 (1934-36= 100)
Wholesale
price Rice ~rice Rice mice
































































































































































































l 99 114.8 .97
---- 102.4 .91
Source: Wholesal~ Price Index: Hundred Year Statistics of ~
Japanese E=Y, Statistics Dep~ent, Bank of Japan,
1966. pp. 76, 77.
Rice Price- (l_): -Statistical Yearbook, 1949, p. 634,
~index base has been shifted from 190W300 to 1934-3&100.
~~- (~): Hundred Year Statistics of th~Ja~anese ——
Economy, Statistics Department, Bank of Japan, 1966, p. 90.67
Table 111.6 .--Pi.antings of Japanese type and Ponltii rice varieties ’in
Korea and Taiwan, selected years
Plantinqs of Japanese-type varieties
Percent of total Average yield




1912 39 3 1,160
1917 590 41 1,354
1922 979 67 1,458
1927 1,163 77 1,633
1932 1,245 00 1,504
Plantinas of Ponlai varieties
Percent of total Average yield






a/ 1st orop- “4 .2 1,749
%d crop 1,420
1926
Ist crop 111.8 45.2 1,644
2nd crop 11.4 3.9 1,573
i930
1st crop 00.4 30.6 1,083
%]d crop 54,9 16.6 1,624
1935
1st crop 186.9 64.8 2 ~243
2nd crop 118*O 32.0 2,057
~/The 1st crop in Taiwan is the dry season crop.
Source: ~Z; p. P@
Japan Statistical Year HOOk Bureau of Statistics, Office —— . . -. $
of the Prime Minister, 1949, pp. 630, 631.
Taiwan Food Statis~,ic.s, Taiwan Provincial Food Bureau, ..— — —— . . ..—
1965, (and earlier issues),, Taipei, pp, 18-22... .. . .... . .. .. ..
68
Table 111,7. --Production, are~ and yield of brown rice in Korea, 1912-1940
Year Production Area Yield
thousand kilograms/



















































































































1919-1920 1,980 1,406 1,330
1920-1921 to
1929-1930 2,208 1,557 1,418
1930-1931 to
1939-1940 2,833 1,618 1,755
Source: QJ21iQstatistical Xiixzwl Bureau of Statistics, Office of
the Prime Minister, 1949, pp. 630, 631.69
Table JII..8. --Production,area and yield of brown rice in Taiwant 1900-1940





























































































































































Year Production Are a Yield
thousand kilograms/
metric tons hectares hectare
Averaae
1900”1910 to
1909-1910 543 419 1 ;281
1910-1911 to
1919-1920 661 482 1,372
1920-1921 to
1929-1930 823 540 1,555
1930-1931 to
1939-1940 1,259 652 1,930
Source: Taiwan Food Statistics, 1964, Taiwan Provincial Food Bureau,
Taipei, 1964, pp. 2-3. —
i
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Table 111.11 .--Korean rice production and exports to Japan, annual
averages 1912-1916, 1917-1921, 1922-1926
Years Fxports as percent
(average) Production Exports of production
- thousand metric tons - - percent -
1912-1916 1,771 152 8.5
1917-1921 2*030 316 15.6
1922-1926 2,088 625 29.9
Source: fi8; p. 31J1.
.-..... —.-76
Table 111.12. --Per capita annual consumption of rice in Japan, Taiwan
and Korea, 1910-1940
Year Japan Taiwan Korea
(old (new
series) series)


























































































































1910-1919 161.3 a/ ----- 1o7.2-
1920-1929 168.4 166.5 86.3





.-. . k .....
Hundred Year Statistics of the —. .—
Statistics Department, Bank of
(continued)





Taiwan: Taiwan Food Statistics, 1965 (and earlier issues), ——
Taiwan Provincial Food Bureau, Taipei, The
Taiwan data represents per capita supplY available
for domestic utilization rather than per capita
consumption.
Korea: -Beikoku~ (~ Situation ~-),
Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Korean
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IV, SUMMARY -
We recognize that it is difficult to draw broad inferences about
future patterns of international generation and transmission of tech-
nology in agricultural products from the evidence in these three cases.
However, we will summarize the commonelements that we see in these
three cases. Wewill also draw on this and other reIated work in mak-
ing some tentative inferences regarding future patterns of international
technical change in agricultural products.
Technical change in all three cases was generated by organized re-
search effort, the effort being more highly organized the more advanced
the basic technology. Early sugaroane breeding, for example, was some-
times accomplished on individual plantations. Virtually all of the
major canes, however, were the product of experiment station researoh.
The Stage IV varieties were all produced
techniques and working in well-organized
Likewise, advances in rice breeding were
experiment stations established for this
by scientists using advanced
research establishments.
and are being produced by
purpose. The advances in
banana production were generated by researchers working with large
private organizations.
~/
Research accomplishments have in many cases followed concentrated
effort to solve specific economic problems. The accomplishments in the
banana case can be traced to the effort put forth in response to the
problems caused by Panama disease. Later, the problems associated with
handling and processing the new disease-resistant varieties led to irs- %, ~& :;,,,.,?” , ,’. , ,,,. ;“.:,+ .),,!! ,,”. , .,J... ...,.:. ,. , , ..— ... .... —- .- ............. ..... . . –-—. - . . . . ..-. - ,. ./.” . . . . . . —,. .




many instances in which 8 disease problem formed the basis for a sus-
tained effort to find new disease-resistant, higher-yielding varieties.
The international transmission of te~:hnieal change is a function
of both the specific characteristics of the technology and of economic
incentives. The characteristics of the technology that appear to be
most important concern the information or k~]owledge required to imple-
ment the technology into ant.ual production processes. The simplest
form of technology from this point of view might be a new higher-yield-
ing crop variety which is adapted to a wide range of climate and soil
conditions and does not requir~ any changes in producing, processing,
or marketing techniques. Some of the
varieties was of this sort. Only the
ability was needed to encourage rapid
these varieties.
,{,
early transfer of sugarcane
economic incentive of profit-
international transmission of
Information is needed for international transmission even when
the technology is embodied simply in ttte seed of a plant variety, A
grower must have some information about the relative yield and quality
of a new variety before he can determine whether a change is profitable.
This information was relatively easy to obtain for those Sugarcane
varieties which were adapted to wide climatic and soil conditions. The
Stage 11 sugarcane varieties were thus transferred relatively easily.







each of the new varieties were resistant. A similar degree of informa-
tion was required in the banana disease cas~e Rapid transmission of
technology requiring this degree of information tof~k Place o~~y with tbe
organized testing effort of experiment stations or of large private
concerns.
‘I%ansmission is further complicated when knowledge is required
regarding new production, processing, and marketing techniques. In
the banana case, the solution to the processing and marketing prob-
lems took the form of important new technical advance. The trans-
mission of rice varieties from Japan to Korea also involved knowledge
of uew cultural practices. In addition to organized research effort,
some form of extension’ effor% often is required to achieve transmission
of new technolog~~.
The most complicated and sophisticated forms of technical transfer
are those illustrated b,Ythe Stage IV sugarcane breeding effort and the
transfer of rice technology from Japan to Taiwan. In these cases, the
technology that was transferred was not directly embodied in a tangible
input. such as a plant seed. It. took the form of knowledge or scientific
information regarding plant breeding techniques.
Technology transfer of this kind depends heavily on the existence
of effective research orga~izations. A minimum number of competent
research scientists committed to the transfer and further development
of this technology are required. In addition, the organization must
provide the environment for the communication ;~nd complementary inter~83
One would expect to find the lag or “technology gap” that exists
between the most advanced technology used in the production of a given
crop and the least advanced technology to be related to the difficulty
of international transmission. Thus, in cases in which the technology
is embodied in an input and where little information is needed to
determine the profitability of that input, the lag should be relatively
short. We would expect the longest lag and the widest technology gap
to exist in those agricultural products in which the transfer of in-
formation and knowledge is in the “Stage IV” level. Agricultural de-
velopment, at the present time, appears to reflect technology gaps
which have been so determined.
Technology transfer of the easiest sort appears to have been
limited to relatively few agricultural commodities. For a few
countries, technical change in sugarcane, rice, and a number of the
tropical crops has been transferred without extensive Stage IV-type
research activity. These transfers have been accomplished with limited
research activity. In a few additional cases, such as the spread of
open-pollinated corn in Thailand, the transfer has involved some ex-
tension activity including added investments in clearing, draining,
and irrigating new lands.
However, for most major crops the transfer depends on the exist-
ence of research organizations capable of performing Stage IV-type
research. Generally, research organizations with this capability are
scarce in the less-developed economies. Exceptions in sugarcane and
bananas have been noted. The rice breeding effort in Taiwan and
research effort in other tropical crops are also exceptions.84
The technology gap for many of the major feed and food grains
exists largely because good Stage IV research organizations do not
exist in many less-developed countries. This gap has been widening
for many years as the research organizations of the developed countries
have continuously generated new technology and technical change which
has not been transferred to the less-developed countries.
The efforts of the developed countries, particularly the United
States, to foster the transmission of agricultural technology to the
less-developed nations have not been particularly successful. Where
the United States government has failed in this respect however, the
33/ The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations have partially succeeded.—
Rockefeller program in Mexico and the international Rice Research In-
stitute (IRRI) in the Philippines are examples of the kinds of research
organizations which are essential to the closing of the technology gap.
In addition,to the Mexican and IRRI programs, a number of other
efforts are underway. It appears that Stage IV research activity is
now being activated on a much broader basis. The results of these
efforts will be a narrowing of the technology gap that presently exists.
In some crops it is possible that the gap is already diminishing. In
others, the gap may yet widen. However, we expect that efforts to ex-
pand Stage IV research activities in agricultural technology will be
successful enough to stimulate a “catching up” phase by the less-devel-
oped economies. This development of an international technology gap
followed by its later reduction is not peculiar to agricultural products.~fj
There are important implications to this catching up phase for both
world trade and individual country gains from trade. It is diffiuult to
speculate in detail about the specific shifts in trade, but evidence from
811 three cases in this paper indicates that shifts in technology levels
clearly do affect trade patterns. We expect the less-developed countries,
for example to become more self-sufficient in the production of certain
feed and food grains. Some of the major importers among less-developed
nations may shift to an export status in the relatively near future.
The food aid and surplus-disposal programs of the United States, Canada,
and Western Europe probably will be re-examined as many of the develop-
ing countries expand their own production with newly-developed techno-
logies +
This catching up phase due to international transmission of tech-
nology generally will result in an improvement in the welfare of the
less-developed countries as they improve their competitive position in
world markets. Those developed countries which are presently
enjoying a long lead in technology probably will experience a




considerations arising from this change since it represents improve-
ment in the welfare of poorer nations relative to rich nations. Never-
thel~ss, the pressure from developed-country producers for protection-
ist trade policies to maintain present trade patterns and price levels
~~~ ,.will,probably be intensified.
,,. .! ,,A r ,.,, ,, ... ,,’,, ,,, ”.






Experiment Station, ~cien~ Journal
~*/ The authors are Assistant Professor, Associate professOr and
Professor, respectively, in the Department of Agricultural Economics,
University of Minnesota.
~/ The authors are indebted to Mr. John Galstad, Department of Agri-
cultural Economics, University of Minnesota, for assistance in the
statistical tabulations and analyses of this section.
~/ The canesugar industry was a key part of the colonial empires of
the nineteenth century. Slavery in the British West Indies was also
integrally related to the production of sugarcane. For documentation
see f,,, 5, 34, 4@.
~/ Prior to that time cane plants reproduced asexually except for
rare instances of sexual reproduction in wild
duotion is still the means of reproducing all
canes. Asexual repro-
commercially grown cane.
Portions of the cane plant (usually the upper purtion of the stalk) are
planted and new plants grow from these segments.
~/ The opportunity to reproduce cane both sexually and asexually is
important in sugarcane breeding. A successful cross between two cane
plants may produce numerous seedlings. A single superior seedling can
be reproduced asexually and create a completely new variety. Testing
a~d selection of superior seedlings from thousands of candidates is a ,.87
~/ This problem continues to plague mne’breddms. MddmmwNieties
P
tdnd to undergo a dettmioration in yield capability after several Year4
of commercial production. New diseases continually make inroads on the
old varieties. m
&/ Also an important Stage II station.
~/ This calculation adjusts for shifts in European and non-European
grower percentages and a reduction in the number of ratoon crops (crops
grown from the regrowth of the cane plant after cutting -- as many as
5 or 6ratoon crops were grown). Since yield declines with the number
of ratoon crops harvested, an adjustment was made for the differential
age of the Uba cane being phased out and the new varieties being
planted. The ratooning, of course, saves the expense of planting cane.
It is a faotor which slows down the speed of adoption of new varieties.
~/ The 28 peroent is calculated from actual yield comparisons of old
and new varieties under similar production conditions.
~/ Indonesia (Java) experienced a yield decline after the 1930-40
period and sharp export reduction beginning
ing until 1950 when both yields and exports
factors account for this pattern. Prior to
second only to Cuba as a sugar exporter and
behind Cuba and India. Java and Hawaii had
cane yields in the 1930’s, Today yields in
in the 1930’s and continu-
began to increase. Many
the late 1930’s Java was
ranked third in production
the world’s highest sugar-
Java are less than half
those of Hawaii. Java was acknolwedged to have the world’s most
efficient and modern processing industry in 1930. The depression of
the 1930’s coincided with relatively high production levels for sugar,88
(to a considerable degree induced by Java-bred canes). Java as the
world’s major “free” market supplier was forced to cut back exports
substantially in 1933. She was not favored in the International Sugar
Agreement developed at this time. Aware of the expansion in world
supplies as a result of the Java varieties, the government attempted
to prevent the release of any new varieties outside of the country.
War and Japanese occupation followed the depression. Many of the pro-
cessing mills were destroyed during this period. From 1945 to 1949
internal revolution took place. This was partially directed against
the s’ugarcane-producing industry which was an integral part of the
“dual” structure which existed prior to
1950 the processing industry was almost
fields had reverted to jungle and other
the war. As a result, by
entirely destroyed, cane
crops, and what surely was
one of the most outstanding agricultural experiment station. in
history was closed. ~~, 9, 34, 40, 431
~/ Cuba is the only major cane-producing country to have a rela-
tively weak experiment station. Only two commerically-produced vari-
eties have originated there. One of these M cuca, is of unknown
parentage and was produced by an
Q/ Factors other than varietal
Yield increases often are due to
lizer use, irrigation, and other
unknown breeder. L44
change will affect yields, of course.
the interaction of increase in ferti-
inputs with new varieties. It is
difficult to measure the extent to which the yield changes werq due to
new varieties, but it would appear to be the major factor.~/ Most of the experiment stations for other agricultural crops have
not been privately financed because producer groups have been too diffi-
cult to organize and no individual producer is large enough to capture
the benefits from research.
~/ All sugarcane research costs in the South African experiment sta-
tion to 1945 (the ending data of the period of introduction of Stage II
and 111 varieties from other countries), accumulated at an interest
rate of 6 percent, amounted to 830,782 Rand. After subtracting seed
costs associated with the new varieties a stream of annual benefits can
be calculated from the supplY function shift using a technique devel-
1T27 These measured annual benefits also were oped by Griliches. _
accumulated at 6 percent to 1945. Assuming no further increases in
yield, an annual flow of benefits was calculated by assuming the 1945
yields to remain constant and adding to this flow 6 percent of the
accumulated benefits as of 1945. The result of the annual benefit
flow was 2.47 times the accumulated research costs of 1945. This could
be interpreted as a 247 percent rate of returns to investment in re-
search. But, for reasons discussed above, such an interpretation may
not be correct. Li, 0, 7, 11, 3~T
~/ If one makes the same calculations and assumptions for the South
African case as in footnote 13 except for the 1945-60 period when the
station was contributing Stage lV varieties to the conomy, the annual
benefit flow is 1.2 times the accumulated costs to 1960. This might
more legitimately be interpreted as a 120 percent rate of return to in-
vestment in research. Of course, if one chooses to express this as an90
“internal” rate of return, it would be much lower. The assumption that
yields would remain constant is not fully justified. Yields tend to
decline over time with new varieties. Even after making additional ad-
justments of this sort, we would have to conclude that the South
African investment in research has yielded a very high return.
15/ Much of the background material for this section is drawn from
H. B. Arthur, J. P. Houck, Jr., and G. L. Beckford Tro~ical Aari-
business: Structures and Adjustments -- Bananas, Harvard Business
School, (now in press). That study as well as this discussion relies
heavily on data kindly provided by private trade sources, especially
United Fruit Company and Standard Fruit and Steamship Company.
Professor H. B. Arthur of the [Iarvard Business School offered helpful
suggestions on this section of the paper.
16/ Private producers tied to one or the other of the major companies
through production contracts, credit arrangements, and disease control
programs are considered as part of company production for
sion.
17/ Further research and field experience has shown that
this discus-
sigatoka
control can be achieved through application of either an oil-based or
a low volume organic fungicide spray delivered by aircraft or knapsack
sprayer. This development, occurring in the 1950’s, has eliminated
the need for the
era,
18/ During this
cumbersome water-spray installations of the earlier
period; Guatemala, Iionduras, Costa Rica, and Panama
accounted for about 95 percent oi’ all Central American banana shipments.91
19/ In 1955-57, bananas accounted for 13, 34, 54, 72 percent of export
revenues for Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama, respectively,
see Table 11.4.
2Q/ The term “new varieties” is not meant to suggest that the adopted
varieties were genetically or botanically new. They were simply new to
commercial production and export from these areas.
21_/ With Gros Michel, the major companies expected to lose an average
of 20 to 25 percent of their mature banana plants annually due to blow-
downs,
22/ Legal restrictions prevent the major importing companies from
operating their own ripening and distribution facilities. An owner-
ship transfer occurs for virtually all U.S. banana imports at dock-
side.
~/ This assumes that the availability of both stem and boxed fruit
from the relatively open market in Ecuador kept import prices reason-
ably close to competitive levels.
&/ There are other economic and political considerations, beyond the
scope of this discussion, which also favor banana expansion in these
countries.
25/ The authors are indebted to Yujiro Hayami, Ramon H. Myers, James ~.
Nakamura and Henry Rosovsky for review and criticism of an earlier
draft of this section of the paper and to Aida Recto and John Sanders
for assistance in the statistical tabulation and calculations,
76/ “The years after 1920 were difficult years for Japanese agricul- &
ture. Cheap rice began to be importec! from Korea and Formosa, where92
rice cultivation had been encouraged by the Japanese government follow-
ing the food shortage of World War I and the rice riots that resulted
in 1918.” & p. 3327
27/ The general pattern described above has been challenged by
Nakamura. L57, 2~T Nakamura argues that agricultural production was
underestimated at the beginning of the Neiji period and that the
gradual improvement of production estimates between the mid-1870’s and
the early 1920’s has inflated the rate of output and productivity
growth during the first “epoch”. It appears that Nakamura’s criticisms
are stimulating review and revision of the “official” estimates. How-
ever, these revisions will not destroy the generalizations about the
four broad “epochs” described above, For further discussion of this
issue see the following references. ~i5, 22, 2~T
28/ Early efforts to expand rice production on Hokkaido were also
relatively unsuccessful. It was not until after World War II that
efforts to achieve high and relatively stable average yields were
successful in Hokkaido. f.1, pp. 319, 435-47g7
29/ The early Japanese efforts to improve rice yields in Taiwan
emphasized selection and diffusion of the highest yielding native
indica varieties. In spite of a large reduction in the number of in-
ferior varieties grown and substantial diffusion of superior varieties,
the average yield showed only modest gains. Early efforts to intro-
duce Qonica varieties from Japan were not successful. Even after
substantial modification in cultural practices, the high yield
potentials of theJ “a~onica varieties were only partially realized under,.. .. . . .,, ., ..,,
.-. .- ... -. .- ..
. ..
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Taiwan conditions. Efforts were then directed to breeding varieties
which combined the desirable characteristics of the introduced ,iaponica
varieties (high fertilizer response, short growing period, nonsensitiv-
ity to photo period, and better quality) with the resistance to disease
and the superior adaptation to the local ecology of the native indica
varieties. The new varieties developed in Taiwan using japonica
genetic materials are referred to as ponlai (or horai) varieties.
The first ponlai variety was introduced commercially in 1922 when
it was planted on 414 hectares in the Hsinchu region. An exceptionally
high yield of 2,517 metric tons of brown rice per hectare was achieved,
Later the planted areas were increased and extended to the Taipei and
Taichung regions. With the diffusion, average yield declined. After
1925 an outbreak of rice blast disease, to which the new varieties were
highly susceptible, sharply reduced the ponlai yields. Beginning in
1930 other ponlai varieties with greater resistance to the rice blast
disease were introduced. Over 20 years had elapsed between the intro-
duction of the first ~aponica varieties and the development of the
PM varieties which possessed sufficient advantage over the local
varieties to justify rapid diffusion. fT7, pp. 331-33#
&l/ The actual average rate of rice production growth in the period
between 1900-03 and 1919-22 was 1.3 percent per year. The “isolation
model” suggests a similar growth rate of 1.3 percent for the 1919-22
to 1937-40 period when imports were presumed to be prohibited. The
actual production growth rate was 1.1 percent per year in the presence
of imports from other nations. Years before 1900 were omitted from ~ ~,.
this comparison in order to avoid the data prob
&7, 2@
ems ra
&/ The results presented here should be treated more
sed by Nakamura.
as the statement
of a hypothesis than as a final conclusion. Work is currently underway
by Yujiro Hayami and V. W. Ruttan to test the colonial trade import
hypotheses more vigorously.
&/ In terms of the sugarcane terminology, the banana breeding effort
would be classified as Stage I research since it involved the seleetion
of natural varieties.
~/ The economic development efforts associated with the foreign aid
and technical assistance programs of the United States have, until
recently, given agricultural development low priority. The viewpoint
was that the key to economic growth is the development of industrial
and urban service sectors, even
policy of attempting to develop
at the expense of agriculture. This
an economy by making it look like a
developed economy has not been particularly successful. As interest
now turns to searching for “cheap sources of growth” or high-payoff
investments, more attention is being paid to the agricultural sector.
The establishment of first-rate, Stage IV research stations is likely
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